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Abstract
We examine monetary policy in the Euro area from both theoretical and empirical
perspectives. We discuss what theory tell us the strategy of Central banks should be
and contrasts it with the one employed by the ECB. We review accomplishments (and
failures) of monetary policy in the Euro area and suggest changes that would increase
the correlation between words and actions; streamline the understanding that markets
have of the policy process; and anchor expectation formation more strongly. We exam-
ine the transmission of monetary policy shocks in the Euro area and in some potential
member countries and try to infer the likely eﬀects occurring when Turkey joins the
EU ﬁrst and the Euro area later. Much of the analysis here warns against having too
high expectations of the economic gains that membership to the EU and Euro club will
produce.
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11I n t r o d u c t i o n
The end 1998 witnessed an experiment of historical importance in monetary policy, chal-
lenging, exciting and, at the same time, risky. Launching the European Central Bank
(ECB) and establishing it as credible and respected institution, capable of managing the
transition from a number of Central banks to a European one and of dialoguing and in-
teracting with the Central banks of other major developed countries; introducing a new
currency and setting solid foundations to maintain its international value; harmonizing
banking regulations and the supervision activities constituted a complex and ambitious
agenda whose implementation required eﬀective measures and ingenuous actions; the costs
of disrupting monetary and credit markets of such a large group of countries were rightly
considered to huge. Many, in ﬁnancial markets and oversees, doubted that accomplishing
such a formidable feat was possible. Those who were more optimistic worried about the
possibility of successfully achieving the goals within a reasonable time frame. The diﬃcul-
ties encountered in the 1980s and 1990s in managing and maintaining a system of ﬁxed
exchange rates; the heterogeneities of member’s economies and of policymakers preferences;
the historical diﬀerences in laws and regulations were clear stumbling blocks in the minds of
academics and market observers and all contributed to make the starting of ECB operations
and the related transformations a one-time extraordinary and, in many ways, unpredictable
event.
Yet, looking back six year later, one can only be amazed by the number of results such a
young institution has managed to achieve in such a short amount of time. We had terrorist
attacks and sneaky wars; we had oil prices swinging up and down, as they have not done since
the beginning of the 1990s; we had a number of food price crises; we had confusions about
the eﬀects and complains about the way the Euro changeover took place; we had plenty
of bickering among politicians to strategically locate their countries in the Euro arena.
Still, on average, the inﬂation rate was at its lowest level in decades; ﬁnancial markets
behaved orderly in responses to shocks which could have had catastrophic consequences,
and slowly but surely the ECB is establishing itself as a credible and solid decision maker.
Despite the generally poor state of the European economy and the weak growth outlook,
much of which is related to the structural imbalances of the Euro area economies, such
as low productivity, low participation rate, aging population, language and institutional
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governments to pursue more expansionary policies and to relax the strict corset imposed
by the price stability goal. The short term (and short minded) gains and popular approval
that came with it were rightly weighted against the much more problematic long term
costs arising from the more ineﬃcient unemployment and inﬂation trade-oﬀ which would
have been established as a consequence of such actions. Available publications, speeches
by Board members and the President of the ECB have repeatedly tried explain to the
public and the markets what are the targets of monetary policy, what is the strategy and
the operational framework that shape policy decisions, what monetary policy can and can
not do, so as to enhance the transparency of the policy process. The understanding that
expectations formation is crucial to enhance/disrupt the transmission of monetary policy
decisions and that the best outcome that monetary policy actions can achieve is anchoring
inﬂation expectations is present in the major public statements of ECB oﬃcials.
Clearly, we should be grateful that potentially disruptive shocks pass over our heads
with very little eﬀects on our everyday life, bank accounts and welfare. Nevertheless we, as
probably other commentators, feel that some of these achievements may have been obtained
despite what the ECB has done and that there is ample room for improvements both in
the strategy, in the communication and also, probably, in the decision making process. We
also believe that the experience of other Central Banks taught us important lessons and
these experiences can be used as benchmarks to compare words, actions and outcomes in
the Euro area. Finally, the recent expansion and the predicted further enlargement to the
east of the EU poses important questions and challenges to those who run monetary policy
which, although surely present in the mind of ECB oﬃcials, are not entirely spelled out in
the oﬃcial publications.
Given this background, this paper addresses three interrelated issues. First, we discuss
what modern theory tell us about the monetary policy strategy that should be adopted
by Central banks and contrasts it with the one employed by the ECB. In the process we
review accomplishments (and failures) of monetary policy in the Euro area over the last ﬁve
years and suggest some changes which, in our opinion, would help to reduce the tensions
created by the low correlation between words and actions; streamline the understanding
that markets have of the policy process and, as a consequence, improve its transparency;
and more clearly anchor expectation formation. We also brieﬂy touch on the issue of the
3Euro changeover and discuss the nature of the gap between actual and perceived inﬂation.
Second, we examine the transmission of monetary policy decisions in the Euro area and
in a few potentially new member countries and third, we try to infer on the basis of this
analysis the eﬀects which are likely to occur when Turkey joins the EU ﬁrst and the Euro
club afterwards. Much of the analysis here uses the experience of past newcomers to provide
a scenario of the probable gains and warns against having too high expectations regarding
the economic improvements that membership to the EU/Euro will produce.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. The next section describes the monetary
policy strategy favored by academic economists, confronts it with the one of ECB and of
other Central Bankers and makes some suggestions to improve the coherence between words
and actions and to improve the framework for policy formation. Section 3 focuses on the
transmission of monetary policy shocks in the Euro area and in some Central European
countries. Section 4 describes the likely eﬀects that joining the EU ﬁrst and the Euro later
will have on the Turkish economy. Section 5 concludes.
2 Monetary Policy: Theory and Practice
Since the beginning of 1990’s, there has been a revolution in the way Central banks see their
mandate and communicate with the markets and the public. Up to then, Central banks were
secretive institutions, which spent little time clarifying their objectives and their strategies,
and often surprised or confused market participants with their setting of the policy instru-
ment. A secretive approach was preferred, in part, because it was thought to provide a
good shield against political oversight, an important precondition to achieve Central Banks
independence (see e.g. Mishkin (2004)). In the last 15 years, Central Banks have dealt
with political pressures in a completely diﬀerent manner. Almost all policymakers, both in
the industrialized and the developing world, now recognize that transparency and improved
communication with the public are key ingredients to run a successful monetary policy, both
in the sense of allowing markets to smoothly predict and to adjust to policy changes and of
eﬀectively anchoring inﬂation expectations. To gain public support and to build conﬁdence,
Central banks have now engaged in a capillary information process, and to acquire credibil-
ity they have improved both the accountability and the transparency of the policy decision
process. As a consequence, a pletora of speeches, documents and publications, describing
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cannot do, and in general, the philosophy and the strategy behind policy decisions are now
available at the oﬃcial web site of many Central banks.
For academic economists, a good monetary policy is easy to design and the basic ingredi-
ents which make policy successful easy to characterize. What turns out to be complicated is
how to make the general principles contained in such a prescription operational. As Svens-
son (2004) puts it ”The principles for good monetary policy are simple: perform ﬂexible
inﬂation targeting ...... The practice of constructing (inﬂation) forecasts and of deciding the
appropriate instrument rate is quite complicated... and requires collecting and processing
of vast amounts of data, thorough analysis, and skillful combination of judgment and model
results”. Various Central banks have taken this recipe seriously and altered policies to ad-
here as close as possible to this simple and general principle. Strangely enough, the Fed, the
ECB and the Bank of Japan, the central banks of the three major economies of the world,
have not followed this lead and have instead continued to be quite opaque in characterizing
their policy strategies and/or in explaining their decision making process, even though in
public appearances some oﬃcials (see e.g. Poole (1999) and (2001)) also appear to favor
the principles underlying an inﬂation targeting strategy.
Why is ﬂexible inﬂation targeting the favorite choice of academics? Because such a
policy directly aﬀects inﬂation expectation - the key mechanism for transmitting monetary
policy decisions - and does this in a transparent and straightforward way. Policy actions, in
fact, produce changes the economy primarily through expectations formed in the ﬁnancial
markets ﬁrst and in the household and ﬁrm sectors later. Central banks set a target rate
for their instruments but it is expectations about the level of that target in the future which
determine interest rates all along the yield curve. In particular, expectations about how the
Central bank responds to likely scenarios in the future determines the expected inﬂation
rate. Assuming that the objectives of the Central Bank are sound, the success of monetary
policy critically depends on market expectations and market conﬁdence. When expectations
are accurate and conﬁdence high, markets understand what a Central bank does and have
no incentive to deviate from the set path of inﬂation. When expectations turn out to be
wrong and/or conﬁdence low, private agents may try to gain from strategically inﬂuencing
the expected inﬂation rate with the setting their choice variables.
What makes ﬂexible inﬂation targeting appealing relative to other strategies? First,
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variables needed to produce inﬂation forecasts, e.g. output and/or unemployment. Publi-
cations of these numbers increases Central banks’ accountability; gives them right incentive
to generate good forecasts, and as a by-product, enhances credibility if the forecast record
is consistently on target over time. Second, given that monetary policy aﬀects the economy
with delays which are random in time and magnitude, ﬂexible inﬂation targeting focuses
policy actions on medium run and therefore reduces the importance of day-to-day responses
to inﬂation variations. Third, since monetary policy works through the expectations of fu-
ture instrument settings and since expectations of the future level of inﬂation and output
matter for current pricing and production decisions, ﬂexible inﬂation targeting helps in the
management of expectations. Hence, publications of inﬂation forecasts, increased trans-
parency and improved public understanding of the policy decision process could all help to
increase monetary policy eﬀectiveness.
The existence of an operational medium term objective is important to anchor both
inﬂation expectations and the level of nominal variables. Its absence in the 1970s-1980s
was one of the reasons why markets paid so much attention to short run policy actions and
seemingly routine speeches by policymakers. In comparison, in the 1950s and 1960s Central
Bank actions received less attention because the long term policy objective was deﬁned by
gold standard arrangements. Hence, the public’s estimate of the long term inﬂation rate
was not much aﬀected by speeches or short term policy actions even though, in retrospect,
agents should have paid more attention than they did to Central bank choices, since they
produced an environment which was inconsistent with the survival of the gold standard.
Why is inﬂation targeting diﬃcult to implement? A Central bank that follows such
a strategy needs to assess the future path of inﬂation and of other macroeconomic forces
and the future path of the instrument rate. Furthermore, it needs to communicate to the
markets how it will adjust the instrument rate in response to unexpected events or economic
developments that make the future path of inﬂation deviate from the target. The ﬁrst of
these activities requires considerable staﬀ work and the development of models which are
able to predict future (not track past) tendencies in the economy. A variety of models
are needed for the task because models are simpliﬁed and stylized constructions, hardly
capable of capturing the detailed interrelationships present in the real world. Furthermore,
lots of ingenuity is needed to judge the outcome of forecasting exercises, for example, when
6deciding if a inﬂation path is unlikely or very likely or when predicting what will be and how
long it will take for the policy decision to take eﬀect. Finally, a clear description of the steps
to be taken once permanent deviations from the target occur needs to be made. Clearly all
of these activities are subject to errors: it does not take a magician to recognize that the
future is largely unforecastable, that information about economic indicators is lumpy and
frequently revised, that human judgment, even a prudent one, is bound to make mistakes
and models are just that, mathematical constructions, often unable to automatically adjust
if the structure of the economy change. For this reason Central Bank communication is
critical in conveying not only the goals of monetary policy and the strategy to achieve them
but also the diﬃculties involved in the decision making process.
We are convinced that markets have already a deep understanding of how monetary
policy works and of the diﬃculties existing in formulating policy in face of uncertainty.
Often, when new information accrues, Central banks and the markets are in close agreement
about the action required to keep the economy on a steady course. Nevertheless, the better
markets understand how and why a Central bank reaches its decisions, the better they will
be able to respond to new information and the closer will it be their reactions to the one of
the Central bank. When this occurs a smoother and more eﬃcient transmission of policy
changes to the economy’s product, labor and capital markets will take place.
It is important to stress that the actual value for the inﬂation target is not nearly as
important as is the decision to choose a target and to create a benchmark for making policy
transparent and accountable. Furthermore, while setting an inﬂation target helps to run
monetary policy smoothly, it is by no means necessary precondition to achieve a low and
steady inﬂation rate. For example, in the US no inﬂation target has ever been announced.
Still, the path of US inﬂation in the last 15 years does not signiﬁcantly deviate from the
path experienced by the best inﬂation targeters.
2.1 The Monetary Policy Strategy of the ECB
The original monetary policy strategy of the ECB, announced by the Governing Council
in October 1998, included three deﬁning features: a strict focus on price stability, mean-
ing that other objectives, such a output or employment stability, where given little or no
consideration; a target range for inﬂation (”below 2 percent”), which was tougher than the
one adopted by inﬂation targeters Central banks such as the Bank of England, and a ”two
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monetary aggregates (ﬁrst pillar), imposed the announcement of a quantitative reference
value for M3 growth, and clustered into the second pillar a wide range of economic and
ﬁnancial indicators providing a broad outlook for price stability.
All three deﬁning features of such a strategy have been criticized. For example, Begg,
et al. (2002) found the strict focus on price stability an unnecessary straightjacket in light
of the development following the events of 2001 and the threat of deﬂa t i o nt h a tl o o m e da s
a consequence, while Gali, et al. (2004) consider a serious strategic mistake, even from an
ex-ante point of view, the tough anti-inﬂationary stance adopted by the Governing Council.
Finally, a too long list of articles to be referenced here criticized the two pillars strategy using
terms ranging from controversial to patently wrong and ill-conceived. In particular, what
attracted the attention of commentators was the artiﬁcial separation of information into two
pillars, the emphasis on monetary aggregates, and the reliance on a quantitative reference
value for M3 growth which, even with various deﬁnitional adjustments, was repeatedly
surpassed in many months since the ECB started its operations.
In a key press release issued in May 2003 and in the Monthly Bulletin of June 2003, the
ECB has announced it had evaluated the soundness of its monetary policy strategy in light
of the economic outcomes obtained in the ﬁrst three and half years of operations. Such an
evaluation led to a series of clariﬁcations, qualiﬁcations and changes that could alter the
way Governing Council decisions will be taken in the future. The reaction to this update
in the strategy has been mixed. Several observers have noted the extraordinary continuity
between the 1998 and the new guidelines and regarded the changes little more than cosmetic,
especially in relationship with the current situation in the Euro area characterized by meager
output and the employment prospects, the dissolution of the Growth and Stability Pact and
ar a t ei n ﬂation, which although relatively low, often and persistently exceeded the upper
bound set by policy. Others have underscored that the updated strategy is simply an
attempt to convince the public that everything is under control and that there is nothing
to worry about (see Gali et. al (2004)). Finally, more benign observers noted that the new
strategy takes a step in the right direction of making the rhetoric square better with the
facts but considered the step an insuﬃcient one.
Three are the cornerstones of the new strategy. First, the issue of price stability is
refocused into the medium term, the risks of deﬂation explicitly examined and the presence
8of inﬂation diﬀerentials in the Euro area given consideration. Second, the target range for
inﬂation is qualiﬁed as being ”below but close to two percent”. Third, the labels and the
importance of the two pillars are reshuﬄed while the control of monetary/credit aggregates
has acquired the role of an ”escape clause” to prevent discretionary traps and self-fulﬁlling
























Figure 1: HICP inﬂation
How is one to interpret these alterations? Figure 1 plots the record of HICP inﬂation
in the Euro area since 1999. Clearly, relatively to the goal (”Below two percent inﬂation”),
the outcome is nothing to cheer about. Even looking only for persistent and sizable de-
viations from the target, a similar conclusion needs to be drawn: the ECB failed to meet
its objectives. Given this observation, the new focus on medium term dynamics and the
qualiﬁcation ”close to” could then be interpreted in at least four diﬀerent ways. It could be
an attempt to make objectives and statements more consistent with the outcomes; it could
be a tacit recognition that the ECB, as a new Central bank, does not have yet the ability to
fully control inﬂation and deﬁnitively not in the short run; it could also be an indirect way
to allow revisions of the target rate of inﬂation in the near future (the two percent threshold
should not be considered an upper bound but the mid-range of the target inﬂation rate)
9and for justifying persistent deviations from the target; or it could simply be a cover up for
expansionary policies designed to limit the risks of deﬂation and the coexistence within the
Euro area of regions facing deﬂationary and inﬂationary processes. Lacking more informa-
tion on the exact motivations, it is hard to take a stand on which option is more likely to
be true. In our opinion, all arguments have some bite and could explain the readjustment
in the rhetoric of ECB statements. In practice, the explicitation of the medium term focus
and the qualiﬁcation of below-but-close-to-two-percent may change very little in the way
the policy discussion proceeds and the Governing Council takes decisions.
T h en e g a t i v ea s s e s s m e n tc o n t a i n e di nﬁgure 1 must however be put in an historical
perspective. Over the last 5 years the rate of inﬂation has been remarkably stable and low
when compared to the previous 30 years. Failure to meet the (overly optimistic) objectives
should therefore not deter from the fact that inﬂation fears were almost absent from public
perceptions (except for the Euro changeover period, see later on); that in many countries
unions agreed to nominal wage increases for medium term contracts roughly in line with
the target level inﬂation; and that a stable environment was largely maintained. In other
words, diﬀerences between the target and the actual rate inﬂation did not trigger important
nominal wage adjustments nor did they produce large welfare costs. Perhaps this is not
surprising. The Bundesbank has also repeatedly failed to meet its objectives, in both the
1980s and the 1990s. Still, German inﬂation was always under control and there were never
any doubts about the credibility of the Bundesbank as tough inﬂation ﬁghter (see Siklos and
Bohn (2003)). Hence, despite the inability to meet the goals and communication problems
noted below, the ECB has been overall successful in keeping the actual rate of inﬂation
close to the target rate.
2.2 Inﬂation expectations
One of the most remarkable achievements of the ﬁrst ﬁve years of life of the ECB has been
the ability to control inﬂation expectations. Given past experiences this is not a small feat
and the ECB often stressed in public statements that, despite the diﬃcult environment,
there were hardly any indication that inﬂationary expectations could were getting out of
control in the last ﬁve years. Gali, et al (2004) are less enthusiastic about the outcome and
indicate that, over the last couple of years, inﬂation expectations are slowly but surely
creeping up. While this could be due to the qualiﬁcations contained in the strategy revision
10of 2003, in particular regarding the target rate of inﬂation and the relative importance of
unexpected inﬂation and deﬂation episodes, it could also indicate that the public not so
upbeat about the current state of inﬂation and that the ECB could loose the control of






















Figure 2: Inﬂation expectations
Figure 2 presents evidence supporting both claims: it reports the weighted average of
inﬂation expectations constructed by the Economics Poll of Forecasters. Clearly, inﬂation
expectations by professional forecasters have been below two percent for almost the entire
time period. Therefore, the ECB is right to rejoice about this achievement. However, as
Gali et al. have pointed out, inﬂation expectations in the last two years are somewhat
higher than they previously were.
While suggestive, poll data is subject to a large amount of measurement error. In
particular, there is a tendency to report numbers which are close to the mean outcome to
avoid being singled out as inaccurate when the actual outcome deviates from the expectation
and this is true even when deviations are not systematic. A better way to check inﬂation
expectations is to directly look at the term structure of interest rates and extract the
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Figure 3: Break-even inﬂation from 10-Year French OAT
Fluctuations in yield to maturity of long-term bonds can be very useful to measure ex-
pectations on long-term inﬂation expectations by market participants. However, measuring
expected inﬂation from yield to maturity on long-term bonds requires the solution of a
signal extraction problem. In fact, nominal yields to maturity on long-term bonds reﬂect
both real long-term interest rates and inﬂation expectations, two variables that are not
observable. To solve the signal extraction problem and understand what ﬁnancial markets
tell us about inﬂation expectations we take two diﬀerent approaches. First, we examine
the break-even inﬂation implied by index-linked French OAT 10-year bonds. The diﬀerence
between the yield to maturity of a nominal French Bond and an index-linked bond with
the same characteristics is a direct measure of expected inﬂation over the residual life of
the two bonds. The break even inﬂation implied by ten-year bonds index OAT (OAT - I
FRANCE 1998 3% 25/07/09 INDXLK) and nominal 10-year French OAT(OAT FRANCE
1998 5.25% 25/04/08) is reported in Figure 3.
T h et r e n do ft h es e r i e sc o n ﬁrms Gali et al. (2004) observation on the tendency of
inﬂation expectations over the last two years and the pattern of ﬁgure 3 replicates quite
12closely the one present in ﬁgure 2 since 2001. Break-even inﬂation, however, is not a perfect
measure of expected inﬂation as the characteristics of the two bonds used to compute this
quantity are never the same. To complement this measure, we therefore examined the
pattern of long-term expected inﬂation implicit in yield to maturity of long-term bonds of
Germany and US at the 10-year maturity. As ﬁgure 4 clearly shows, there has been a clear
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Figure 4: 10-year US and German bonds
Favero and Tristani (2005) consider several explanations for the high and stable con-
temporaneous correlation between US and German long-term interest rates. First, the
expectations model suggests that the level of the term structure depends on the average of
all future monetary policy rates. Therefore, a high correlation of long term rates is compat-
ible with any contemporaneous correlations of policy rates, provided that the correlation
between the average of future expected policy rates is high. Second, if term premia are im-
portant and if there is a world factor in the ”appetite for risk”, then it is possible that long
term rates are more strongly correlated across countries because of they are heavily aﬀected
by risk premia. Third, if the Fed is the dominant monetary policy authority, the monetary
policy of the Fed is responsible for the common pattern in long-term interest rates across
13the ocean. Given that Favero and Tristani conclude that the strong comovements between
US and German long-term rates is primarily due to the common path of expected monetary
policy (mostly driven by common ﬂuctuations in US and German inﬂation and output-gap),
it is interesting to assess the performance in simulation over the sample when the ECB has
been operational of a model where the relation between US and German long-term rates
is estimated over the sample where the Bundesbank was operational. We have estimated
from 1990:1 to 1998:12 an ECM relationship between US and German long-term rates and
then stochastically simulated the model from 1999:1 onwards using the actual path of US
long-term rates in the simulation. The results of our exercise are reported in ﬁgure 5: we
plot the actual German 10-year rates along with the simulated ones and their associated













Figure 5:Actual and simulated German 10-year rates.
Figure 5 is consistent with the idea that inﬂation expectations are slightly increasing in
the last few years. In fact, simulated long-term interest rates are very close to actual ones
over the ﬁrst two years of ECB existence but tend to drift upwards, getting closer ﬁrst and
eventually slightly outside of the upper bound of the conﬁdence interval, over the last few
years.
In sum, the ECB appears to have managed to anchor inﬂation expectations, probably
14more because of the good faith that the markets and the public had in the institution than
for the consistency between deeds and the inﬂation record produced over its ﬁrst ﬁve years
of life. Refocusing the strategy and qualifying the targets can therefore have beneﬁcial
eﬀects. In particular, much clearer statements, explicitly stating what the medium run is,
which policies should be used in case a persistent deviations from the target will emerge
and what the target (and its range) is, would probably make monetary policy actions more
transparent and predictable.
2.3 Communication
There appears to be a substantial diﬀerence in the tone and the content of speeches and
statements posted at the ECB site and those found at, e.g., regional Fed sites or in other
smaller but more receptive Central banks, such as the Riksbank or the Federal Reserve
Bank of New Zealand. ECB statements and speeches are often opaque; the rationale given
for policy choices is at times contorted and its theoretical justiﬁcation somewhat weak;
explanations given for certain strategic decisions are improbable and, at times, more obvious
reasons are given no consideration. Those of the others are crisper, the message is clearer,
to a point that a ﬁrst year undergraduate student in economics would be able to correctly
understand their meaning, and transparency is maximized (compare e.g. Trichet speech
(27-11-2003), Poole speech (30-11-2001) and Sherwin speech (1-7-1999)).
Perhaps, this is not a case. Since the Euro area is a new entity, the transmission of
policy shocks to the region is still somewhat uncertain; the consequences of ECB choices
not yet fully understood and, in general, learning is under way. Opaqueness may therefore
reﬂect diﬃculties in the learning process. However, letting the public know that there
are considerable uncertainties in the current decision making process and that the ECB
and market participants are trying to mutually understand how their decisions interact, is
preferable to presenting a smoky viewpoint. It should also be clear that the publication
of information which is hard to understand and the repetition of concepts which sound
foreigner to the public will not make communication easier or more fruitful. In this respect,
one can not overlook the fact that high ranked oﬃcials in several Central banks around the
world have been in academics before they took policy jobs while, currently, this is hardly
the case at the ECB. Not only an academic background is important to keep in touch with
the development of new and the reﬁnement of old theories. It is important because it forces
15oﬃcials to strip down issues to its basic components, leaving aside peripheral arguments,
and this process is the same when communicating to the markets, when explaining a concept
in a classroom or arguing a view point in a professional conference. As Poole (2001) puts
it ” The easiest way to be sure you understand an issue is to explain it to the others, in
a class, a journal article, a lecture, or in meeting minutes. Transparency is a great spur
to developing coherent views, and surely is beneﬁcial to policymakers to be coherent in
their own thinking.”. Communication and transparency will surely improve in the future
as the details of the Euro area economy become better known. Better communication
and transparency may ameliorate the eﬀectiveness of policy, enhance accountability and
reduce informational noise in the markets. Recognizing the limits to policymaking, given
the available information, is an honest way to achieve this goal.
There are indications that ﬁnancial markets initially did not have a good understanding
of the ECB strategy and of the reasons behind some policy actions (see Sims and Wessel
(2000) or Issing (2001)). The situation does not seem to have improved in later years: for ex-
ample the survey reported in De Haan, et. al. (2004) indicates that professional economists
did not rank the ECB as a highly transparent Central bank. But, apart from surveys,
what does the available empirical evidence tells us about the communication (and the im-
plied credibility) of the ECB? A recent article of Jan-Jansen and De Haan (2004) addresses
exactly this issue by examining to what extent statements of various European Central
bankers have been diﬀerent or contradictory and how has ECB communication improved
over time. They found that there is considerable noise in public statements and several
sources of noise are highlighted. First, national Central bank presidents have made as least
as many statements as members of the ECB Executive Board and there is no evidence that
this trend has been reversed over the years. When information emanates from diﬀerent
sources it may generate confusing messages and make the public think that there are diﬀer-
ent and separate decision making units. Second, statements on interest rates, inﬂation and
output growth have been contradictory. While confusion on the stance of interest rates has
diminished over time and statements have become more correlated, disagreements about the
current and perspective levels of inﬂation and growth have increased over the years. Third,
diﬀerent groups of Central banks have followed diﬀerent communication strategies around
ECB Governing Council meetings. In particular, while ECB executive Board has observed
radio silence, national Central bank oﬃcials tended to communicate more (rather than less)
16before these meetings. Interestingly, some of these features appear to have been engendered
by Bundesbank oﬃcials. In fact, Siklos and Bohn (2003) found that the Bundesbank has
suﬀered similar problems in communicating with the public over the years.
Wilhelmsen and Zaghini (2005) address the related issue of monetary policy predictabil-
ity in the Euro area in comparison to other 13 countries with diﬀerent monetary policy
strategies and regimes. Their result are interesting but somewhat mixed: the volatility of
one month interest rates on the days of the policy change is larger in the Euro area than
in inﬂation targeting countries, such as Sweden, Australia or the UK. On the other hand,
there is little diﬀerence in the predictability of interest rate movements in the US, the Euro
area and Switzerland and in inﬂation targeters. Furthermore, in both sets of countries,
policy changes are quickly incorporated in the term structure of interest rates.
2.4 Pillars
The other major adjustment in the ECB monetary policy strategy was the requaliﬁcation
of the two-pillar strategy. The ﬁrst pillar, now termed economic analysis, is used to identify
short to medium term risks to price stability; the second, now termed monetary analysis,
is used to assess the medium/long term trends of inﬂation and to cross check the results
obtained from the economic analysis.
Several observations about the reshuﬄing of the labels and the reweighting of the two
pillars can be made. First, it appears that the role of monetary factors have been rightly
deemphasized, that the reference value for M3 growth (at 4.5 percent) is no longer an
alternative policy target - probably because the target was consistently and consecutively
exceeded over the ﬁrst 4 years of operations (see ﬁgure 6) - and that the control of monetary
aggregates now involves monitoring a large range of monetary and credit statistics, not
simply the growth rate of M3.
Second, it appears that policymakers believe that when in analyzing price developments,
it is important to have an explicit time series perspective, separating high frequency move-
ments and its more persistent trends, and that factors driving short term, high frequency
movements are distinct from those driving long term ﬂuctuations. Third, implicit in the
formulation of the new policy framework is the idea that monetary factors predict, in an
unconditional sense, inﬂation dynamics in the medium-long run better than any other vari-
able. Finally, cross checking the information coming from economic and monetary analyses,
17appears to be important in the eyes of ECB oﬃcials to ascertain the soundness of the course
of policy. In particular, it is thought to avoid problems connected with myopic overactivism
(see Issing (2002)) - if inﬂation is not a unit root process, inﬂationary/deﬂation pressures
will eventually subside with no need of any policy intervention - to eliminate instabilities as-
sociated with multiple equilibria produced by standard Taylor rules (see e.g. Christiano and
Rostagno (2001)), and to allow a more robust inﬂation stabilization approach. To some-
one like ourselves who earn part of our living analyzing the relationship between prices,
money and real activity, the general principles which constitute the foundations of such an
approach appear not only to be based on an old fashion idea of the macroeconomic interde-
pendencies, questioned or discredited in many academic papers, but also in contrast with



























Figure 6: M3 growth
Macroeconomic time series typically display high frequency, random movements and
more persistent, longer terms ﬂuctuations. One characteristics of inﬂation, noted in many
academic papers (see e.g. Roberts (1995)), and now also well understood in the policy
circles, is its tenacious and persistent nature, at least since the 1970s. The recent ECB
18conference on Inﬂation persistence in the Euro area, held in Frankfurt in December 2004
indicates that such a concern is also present in the agenda of some ECB policymakers.
Persistence means that periods of relatively high inﬂa t i o nt e n dt ob ef o l l o w e db yp e r i o d so f
similarly relatively high inﬂation and that the duration of the ﬂuctuations on either side of
the target tends to be relatively long. It is important to stress that this was not necessarily
the case in the 19th century and in early parts of the 20th century up to WWII. Price
deﬂa t i o no c c u r r e da l m o s ta so f t e na sp r i c ei n ﬂation and inﬂation movements were mean
reverting in nature, that is, high and low periods of inﬂation alternated almost randomly
(see e.g. Friedman and Schwartz (1960), (1963) and more recently Cooley and Ohanian
(1991)).
While the ECB has systematically failed to precisely state what short, medium and long
term mean, one can think of short ﬂuctuations as those occurring and dissipating within
a year or so; medium term ﬂuctuations as those lasting from 18 to 60 months, and long
term ﬂuctuations as those producing inﬂation movements with periodicity exceeding 60
months. While the cut-oﬀ points are arbitrary and the division can be reﬁned to make the
arguments below more precise, it is should be obvious that there is little that economic or
monetary analyses can do to predict the amplitude and the nature of short term movements
of inﬂation except, perhaps, through ex-post introspection. The indicators monitored in the
economic analysis (GDP and its components, ﬁscal policy, labor market conditions, balance
sheet positions, etc.) are not typically available on a very short run basis and when they
are, they are subject to substantial amount measurement or revision error. Moreover, the
relationship between monetary and credit aggregates and short term inﬂation movements
is recognized to be tenuous and, in general, unreliable for predicting inﬂation ﬂuctuations.
Hence, short term inﬂation ﬂuctuations are broadly unpredictable, and only detailed micro
information (e.g. the impact of weather on non-processed food production or the pass-
through of oil price increases to gas pumps) could help us to improve our understanding
and our forecasts of the dynamics of short term price changes.
The rest of this subsection provides evidence on four related and, in our opinion, impor-
tant issues: a) there is little information in the inﬂa t i o nd a t aw h i c hw o u l dh e l pu st op i n
down and predict ﬂuctuations which last longer than 60 months, b) given the persistence
of the inﬂation process, it is impossible to further distinguish ﬂuctuations with periodicity
ranging from 18 to 60 months - these are persistent, medium term ﬂuctuations - and even
19if this distinction was possible it would not help to understand the nature of inﬂation dy-
namics, c) as a consequence of b), shocks which are temporary in nature may take a long
time to dissipate, d) monetary aggregates have little predictive power for medium term
inﬂation ﬂuctuations whenever past inﬂa t i o ni su s e di np r e d i c t i o n ,b o t hi nE u r oa r e aa sa
whole and in the major member countries. On the contrary, an index constructed using
information coming from a variety of disaggregated international data helps to track and
forecast movements in Euro area inﬂation reasonably well since 1990.
Table 1: Dynamics of HICP inﬂation (year to year rates)
1970-2004 1990-2004 1999-2004
Volatility 0.38 0.26 0.11
Faction of variance
due to medium cycles 0.90 0.82 0.77
Persistence 0.76 0.50 -0.25
Table 1 presents statistics summarizing the dynamics of headline (HICP) inﬂation for
the Euro area. It reports, ﬁrst a measure of volatility of the series; second, the fraction of the
variance of inﬂation due to medium term ﬂuctuations and, third, a measure of persistence
for the samples 1970-2004, 1990-2004 and 1999-2004. The share of the inﬂation variance
due to medium term frequencies is obtained extracting the relevant information from the
spectrum of the series with a band pass ﬁlter, while a measure of persistence is obtained
summing up the estimated AR coeﬃcients of the inﬂation process. The spectrum is a useful
device for our purposes since it allows us to split inﬂation movements into orthogonal short,
medium and long term ﬂuctuations, much in the same fashion as a prism allows us to divide
a light beam into its constituent components - from the infrareds (low frequency) to the
ultraviolets (high frequency) waves.
Four features of table 1 are worth commenting upon. First, the bulk of the inﬂation
ﬂuctuation in the Euro area are of medium term nature - both high and low frequency
variations are minor. Second, the volatility of inﬂation at all frequencies is smaller in
the second and third samples. This conforms to the idea that inﬂation has become less
volatile over the last 15 years thanks, in part, to the larger credibility that Central banks of
member countries acquired since the early 1990s. Third, the overall bulk of the ﬂuctuations
since 1999 is also of medium term nature. Fourth, there is also a decline in the estimated
inﬂation persistence in the latter two samples, consistent e.g. with the analyses of Cogley
20and Sargent (2003), Canova and Gambetti (2004) for the US and Benati (2002) for the
UK. Nevertheless, while the estimated persistence for the 1999-2004 sample is signiﬁcantly
diﬀerent from the estimated persistence obtained in the other samples, standard tests fail to
detect any statistical diﬀerence in the persistence measures in the ﬁrst two subsamples. In
sum, table 1 overwhelmingly indicates that inﬂation in the Euro area is a persistent process
and that the majority of the ﬂuctuations are of medium term nature.
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Figure 7: Inﬂation responses
Is it possible to decompose medium term ﬂuctuations further, say, into short-medium
(18-36 months) or medium-long (36-60)? It turns out that such a division is artiﬁcial
for two reasons. First, the magnitude of the ﬂuctuations is roughly the same over two
frequency ranges. Second, a shock that signiﬁcantly move inﬂation for at least 18 months
will also move inﬂation for more than 36 months. To demonstrate this point, ﬁgure 7
presents the response of inﬂation to a typical output gap shock. It is clear that inﬂation is
persistently displaced from its long run path, and that output gap disturbances can induce
longer inﬂation ﬂuctuations than those the ﬁrst pillar of the new ECB strategy is supposed
21capture - a typical shock is not completely dissipated even after 10 years. Figure 7 also shows
how strident is the notion that, in the medium run, monetary variations are tightly linked
to inﬂation developments. In fact, unexpected increases of M3 growth from target produce
inﬂation dynamics which are smaller in size and more short lived than those produced by
output gap disturbances and roughly insigniﬁcant after about two and half years. To put
this observation in another way, over the medium term, the percentage of inﬂation variance
explained by output gap shocks (25 percent) is larger than the one explained by M3 gap
shocks (only 11 percent). It is important to stress that this result is independent of the
sample. For example, had we excluded the last 5 years from our analysis, a period where
M3 growth was persistently above its target probably because of negative return obtained
on many ﬁnancial assets, the same outcome would obtain.
While suggestive of the lack of a tight link between medium term movements of inﬂation
and money growth, this evidence may be still regarded as inconclusive by staunch monetarist
believers. Further evidence on this issue is obtained analyzing the predictive power of various
forecasting models for inﬂation. Canova (2002) examined this issue in details for the G-7
countries. Two of his results are particularly important here. First, a simple univariate AR
model is as good as a model which, in addition to past inﬂation, uses M3 growth rates to
forecast inﬂation at one or two years horizons for Germany, Italy and France in the ﬁve years
leading to the creation of the ECB. Second, a model which uses an index, combining the
information contained in a number of lagged G-7 variables, not only outperforms a model
which uses M3 growth, but also substantially reduces the mean square forecast error of a
simple univariate AR model. Taken, together, these results suggest that there is information
in the cross section of the G-7 countries helpful to predict domestic inﬂation in the medium
run and that M3 growth, while useful for in-sample ﬁt, has no use in out-of-sample prediction
exercises.
Since the index model is available in-house at the ECB, has been shown to have a
consistently good forecasting record over the 1990s (see Canova and Ciccarelli (2003), and
has demonstrated to be superior to a number of alternative benchmarks also for the ﬁrst
ﬁve years of the Euro (see Anzuini et al. (2005), and available in-house at ECB, it is a bit
surprising that its informational content is systematically neglected in the policy making
process and that, in general, international information is ignored in predicting medium term
trends of inﬂation. Since inﬂation is not only a persistent process, but also highly correlated
22across countries, information concerning the state of inﬂation from other areas of the world
not only helps to better predict its domestic medium term trends, but also provides a more
coherent explanation for its causes, both of which make policy decisions, in general, easier.
























Figure 8: Cyclical component of output and inﬂa t i o ni nU Sa n dE u r oa r e a
All of this should be obvious to a keen observer. Globalization means also that shocks
that had an important national component in the past are now swamped by movements
which are common in nature. Figure 8 reports the dynamics of cyclical output and inﬂation
in the Euro area and in the US over the last 35 years. It is easy to see that the ups
and downs of inﬂation and output in the US are followed by ups and downs in inﬂation
and output in the Euro area with about 4-5 months delays. Given this evidence, one is left
wondering why monetary aggregates and not international variables have such a prominence
23in the ECB strategy. Monetary aggregates do not seem to be the major source of inﬂation
ﬂuctuations in the medium run, nor do they help to forecast medium term trends of inﬂation
once obvious information is used. Clearly, this does not mean that monetary (and credit
aggregates) should be set aside both in the analysis and in the decision making process.
But, in our opinion, even the reduced emphasis that the revised ECB strategy puts on
them is unwarranted: monetary and credit aggregates should not be strategically singled
out from all other information and given a predominance in the policy discussion.
In conclusion, the artiﬁcial split of inﬂation ﬂuctuations into those explainable with
economic analysis and those interpretable with monetary analysis, the lack of appreciation
of the tight links between short run shocks and medium term movements in inﬂation and
the failure to entertain a global perspective in evaluating medium term trends of inﬂation
could have been suﬃcient to seriously endanger the price stability goal. Despite of this,
inﬂation has been around the 2 percent level for the last ﬁve years and inﬂation expectations
have been anchored. Perhaps, the markets and the public learned to discount ”incredible”
statements of ECB oﬃcials and more pragmatically looked at facts when deciding a course
of action to take.
2.5 Where do we leave output concerns?
Central bankers, whether they are inﬂation targeters or not, are extremely reluctant to dis-
cuss concerns about output ﬂuctuations (see e.g. Mishkin (2004)). Many important reasons
which may explain this reluctance. First, announcing that a Central bank has two objec-
tives (price stability and elimination of the output gap) may confuse market participants
and make it more likely that the public sees the elimination of short run output ﬂuctuations
as the mission of a Central bank. It is well known that such a perception may lead to ex-
pectation traps: prices and wages could raise because the public knows that the monetary
authority is likely to accommodate these increases pursuing expansionary policies which
prevent the output gap from enlarging. Discussing monetary policy objectives in terms of
output ﬂuctuations may therefore lead to a loss of inﬂation-ﬁghting credibility which may
worsen the actual inﬂation-output trade-oﬀ. The experience of the 1970s is still very vivid
in the mind of macroeconomists and the risks now are probably as large as they were back
there. Second, the announcement that a Central bank has also output objectives can lead
short sighted politicians, like those running many Euro area countries, to exacerbate time
24consistency problems. In particular, they can pressure Central banks to pursue overex-
pansionary policies in order to yield short term gains by exploiting the unemployment and
inﬂation trade-oﬀ. Third, in announcing that output ﬂuctuations are important one needs
to take a stand on what potential output is now and how large will it be in the future and
needs to operationally measure deviations from it. Both academic economists and central
bankers know how diﬃcult is to quantify what potential output is using real time data and
the distortions that can be created with imperfect information (see e.g. Orphanides (2001)).
Furthermore, statistical output gap measures do not necessarily have a close relationship
with theoretical relevant ones. Finally, announcing a second objective requires specifying
how inﬂation and output concerns are weighted in the decision making process, what is the
loss function used by policymakers and this creates a number of practical complications to
the decision making problem. For example, one has to clearly state what is the relative im-
portance of the two objectives, how and in what situations committee members may decide
to change the weights and design ways to extract information from committee members
who are not used to think in these terms.
Despite the rhetoric and the theoretical reasons for shying away from output gap con-
cerns, Central bankers actions show that output ﬂuctuations are very much in their mind.
As shown in Begg et al. (2002), a rule where the short term nominal interest rate responds
only to the output gap ﬁts the time path of interest rates in the 1999-2002 period reason-
ably well, both in the US and in the Euro area. Furthermore, it appears to be superior
to other rules which also make short term interest rates also respond to inﬂation or ex-
pected inﬂation. Extending their exercise up to the end of 2004 changes very little in their
conclusions.
From an academic point of view there is nothing wrong with such a reduced form rule
and, in fact, it is consistent with the prescriptions of many models that economists like
to currently use. However, an interest rate rule of this type underscores once again that
the ECB (and the Fed for that matter) lacks of transparency and this adds to the already
mentioned communication problems, at least to the extent that the words do not match
with the deeds; and may lead in a medium term erosion of conﬁdence in other elements of
Central Bank transparency that are beneﬁcial for the economy. The term ”inﬂation nutters”
minted by Mervin King few years ago (King, 1997) is very much present in the mind of
market participants and such a perception may lead to a rediscussion of the support for
25Central bank policies and independence.
One simple way to communicate to the public that output ﬂuctuations are important
without reducing the emphasis on the medium term inﬂation objective is to state, as sug-
gested e.g. by Mishkin (2004), that large shocks may move the actual inﬂation rate far away
from the target, in which case sticking to the inﬂation objective may cause unacceptably
high output looses. Such shocks do occur in the real world and a policy that recognize
their presence helps markets to orderly behave, makes it clear when and how medium run
objectives can be temporarily set aside and, at the same time, sets up ways to gradually
return to the inﬂation objective. Clauses of this type are present e.g. in inﬂation targeting
regime countries like the UK. Furthermore, Brazil has successfully implemented a policy of
this type when a major exchange rate shock has hit the local economy (see Fraga, et al.
(2003)).
Luckily, and despite the events of the last few years, the Euro area economy has been
shielded from those large shocks which would have required a temporary suspension of
the inﬂation objective. Nevertheless, one must be aware that, e.g., the facts of September
2001 have dramatically increased the volatility and persistently worsened the perceptions
of agents about the future prospects of the world economy. Chronic problems such as the
aging population, the low productivity and low participation rate also combine to create an
environment where output may be permanently below its potential. Stressing that these
are important concerns, that they have to be addressed if the output-inﬂation trade-oﬀ
has to be permanently improved; underlying that the ECB can do nothing to solve these
problems, except pressure national and EU governments, could be an important way to
communicate that the ECB is not an inﬂation nutter and create the consensus needed to
implement those changes which may improve eﬃciency. Along the same lines, the presence of
overexpansionary ﬁscal policies in many member countries, and the increased heterogeneity
one expect to ﬁnd when the EU newcomers will adopt the Euro poses serious threats to
the price stability objective and opens up the possibility that persistent and undesirable
inﬂation diﬀerential will result in the Euro area. Warning about these facts, describing the
mechanics which transform overexpansionary ﬁscal policy in an overexpansionary output
process and how these pressures represent a threat to medium run price stability can catch
two birds with one stone: it may help to establish the link between output gap and inﬂation
process; and to indicate who are responsible for keeping interest rates up, despite the fact
26that the strong Euro decreases both the share of imported inﬂation and the importance of
oil price swings.
2.6 The Euro change-over
The introduction of euro banknotes and coins (the cash changeover), which occurred during
the early months of 2002, has caused a numbers of complains of consumer’s associations
in several Euro area countries. The complains have ranged from losses due to increases in
transactional costs to the alleged inﬂationary eﬀects produced by the change in the unit of
account. Goodhart and Pappa (2003) have tried to measure the size of transactional costs
using supermarket prices and waiting time at cashier lines in the months surrounding the
change. They found that there was a temporary increase in transaction time with a sunk
cost roughly equal to yearly opportunity costs incurred by consumers in withdrawing cash
from banks.
On the second issue, several observers have reported that consumers’ “perceived inﬂa-
tion” (based on qualitative judgements) was systematically larger than actual inﬂation and
in countries such as Italy, Germany, Greece, Spain, the Netherlands there numerous reports
about the price increases brought about by the changeover. In Germany the Euro has be-
came known as the Teuro — teuer means expensive! In Italy, such a phenomenon was more
marked than in other countries. The Italian media and consumers’ associations frequently
reported extraordinary price increases. Among those, the ones recorded by restaurants gave
rise to heated controversies. According to a survey conducted in an Italian region, one third
of citizens blamed restaurants for excessive increases, a percentage second only to the share
of respondents who blamed food prices. Gaiotti and Lippi (2005) examine the veridicity of
these arguments by looking at a panel of restaurants price setting behavior in the year of
the changeover and in the neighboring ones. Their empirical micro-based analysis shows
that a sizeable average price increase took place in 2002 (about 9 per cent). This increase
however was slightly smaller than that recorded in the previous year (about 10 per cent).
Furthermore, it appears that increases were related to rising demand and costs. While they
authors suggest caution in attributing the inﬂationary eﬀect exclusively to the introduction
of the euro banknotes, we ﬁnd the evidence in striking contrast with the hypothesis that
the euro changeover led to a “doubling of prices” by Italian restaurants. This widespread
perception might be ascribed to the substantial price increase which took place in this sector
27but over a longer period. In fact, between 1998 and 2003 the average price of a meal rose
by 40 per cent; in the 10 per cent of restaurants recording the largest increases the increase
is 75 per cent.
Interestingly, the data is consistent with both the “menu cost” and the “market power”
hypotheses. In fact, the evidence shows that much of the aggregate price increases dur-
ing the changeover were due to a greater number of prices being revised, rather than to
“large” individual price increases. Also, market structure aﬀected price dynamics after the
changeover. In 2002 and 2003 the increases were largely due to price jumps in the country-
side and in the provinces, two locations traditionally characterized by a smaller degree of
competitiveness.
What lessons one can learn from this experience, in particular, for countries which are
planning to adopt the Euro? First, the change of unit of account will induce substantial time
costs. Second, it may lead to a faster convergence of regional price levels than experienced
in the past. Third, price increases are going to be more marked in rural areas and therefore
more likely to be perceived by the consumers who are used to much more sluggish price
changes. All in all, appropriate diﬀusion of information, capillary education in non-urban
areas are crucial to prevent the emergence of the dangerous gap between perceived inﬂation
and actual inﬂation that has caused considerable discontent toward the Euro in the past
few years.
3 The transmission of policy impulses
3.1 The Euro Area
There exists a considerable evidence on the transmission of monetary policy shocks in the
Euro area (see e.g. Angeloni et al. (2003), Peersman (2004)). While results somewhat
depend on the study, the sample, the country and the exact methodology employed to iden-
tify disturbances to the policy rule, it is generally agreed that a shock which unexpectedly
increases interest rates makes output and inﬂation decline, even though the magnitude and
the timing of the decline are pretty much uncertain. This uncertainty is due to many factors:
the magnitude of the policy impulse, the sensitivity of credit and/or investment aggregates
to interest rate changes, the expectations of the public and, as a consequence, the reaction
of the yield curve. Since most of the evidence for the Euro area as a whole is based on syn-
28thetic data reconstructed for the pre-ECB regime, we provide some evidence concerning the
eﬀects of policy shocks on industrial output growth, inﬂation and the dollar-euro rate using
monthly data for the period 1999:1-2005:1. Clearly, since the sample is short estimates are
likely to be noisy. Furthermore, the sample we analyze is somewhat special, very rich of
other unexpected events, and therefore may not truly represent the ”normal” features of
the transmission of monetary policy shocks. Nevertheless, our exercise may give us some




































Figure 9: Responses to an interest rate shock
Figure 9 plots the responses of the three variables to a 25 basis points unexpected increase
in short term interest rates where the unexpected increase in the short term rate is identiﬁed
via a liquidity eﬀect (an interest rate increase must decrease narrow monetary aggregates
like M1). Few important features of the ﬁgure are worth some discussion. First, an increases
in the short term interest rate appreciates the Euro and makes industrial production growth
decline, while inﬂation ﬁrst declines and then increases. This pattern which, to a large ex-
tent, reproduces the dynamics present in the pre-ECB era is somewhat standard: higher
domestic short term interest rates attract foreign investors seeking higher return oppor-
29tunities and, at the same time, cool down domestic economic activity. Second, the eﬀect
on industrial production growth is of an order of magnitude larger than the one on inﬂa-
tion. This pattern is less standard but easily interpretable. Typically, the output eﬀects
of monetary disturbances are small. However, output data is not available at the monthly
frequency and industrial production is only a small percentage of output in the Euro area
(roughly, 20 percent). Therefore, while the eﬀect on industrial output is large, the eﬀects
on the service and the agricultural sector are probably small, making the total output re-
sponse considerably smaller. Notice also that, once the monthly eﬀect is cumulated at the
quarterly frequency, the total response is likely to be negligible.
Third, the largest industrial output growth and exchange rate responses are instanta-
neous while the largest inﬂation response is typically observed after about 6 months. While
t h el o c a t i o no ft h em a x i m u mr e s p o n s ei sn o tp i n n e dd o w nw i t hc l o c k m a k e r ’ sp r e c i s i o n ,i t
seems that in the last 5 years, monetary policy disturbances were much quickly transmitted
to the Euro are economy than in the past. While many explanations could be found for
this change, a quicker transmission is consistent with the idea that the public understands
Central banks actions better than it did in the past. Fourth, the eﬀects of a monetary
policy disturbance dissipate relatively quickly and after about 9-12 months the responses
of all three variables are insigniﬁcantly diﬀerent from zero.
In sum, it looks as if monetary policy is a powerful lever for industrial output growth
in the short run while the eﬀects on inﬂation are more sluggish - and this is very much
consistent with the evidence we have presented in the previous section. We think this is a
good news. Monetary policy has the ability to alter the short run path of output growth and
inﬂation if it wishes to do so and can do it relatively quickly. However, unexpected changes
in short term interest rates are unlikely to have any medium term eﬀect on industrial
output growth, inﬂation or, for that matter, the Dollar-Euro exchange rate. Surprising
market participants can not be the medicine to remedy structural imbalances or to ease
frictions. Unsurprisingly, market participants quickly learn about the possibility of being
surprised.
3.2 The New EU members
There is a growing body of literature showing how monetary policy shocks are transmitted
within the 10 new members of the EU and some eﬀort in comparing diﬀerences in the
30responses of these countries with those obtained in the Euro area do exists (see e.g. Ganev et
al. (2002), Supel (2003), Anzuini and Levy (2004), Jarocinski (2004)). The main conclusion
of all studies is that, despite important diﬀerences in the structure of the economies, the
transmission of policy shocks in the old and the new members of the EU is similar. That is
to say, contractionary domestic monetary policy shocks reduce output growth and inﬂation
and, although with some heterogeneities, tend to appreciate the local currency. While the
qualitative pattern is similar, the quantitative eﬀects in the old and the new members of
the EU are diﬀerent. In particular, interest rates responses tend to be more persistent in
the new EU countries and price responses stronger in the medium run but less persistent.
Many reasons may account for the diﬀerences. For example, since these countries are more
open than the Euro area, the exchange rate channel becomes stronger. Moreover, the fact
that these countries are less ﬁnancially integrated, that they have somewhat ineﬃcient
ﬁnancial markets and that they have large amounts of trade credit may make them more
responsive to monetary policy. Is this a good or a bad news for the possible adoption of
the Euro by these countries? In our opinion, it dramatically depends on the reasons that
make transmission diﬀerent. If the heterogeneities between old and new members are the
results of structural diﬀerences, premature adoption of the Euro may force adjustments to
shocks to take place in relative prices. If these adjust slowly, damages can be made. On
the other hand, if the heterogeneities in the transmission are due to lack of Central bank
credibility, the adoption of the Euro could make the transmission of policy shocks quicker
and the output costs smaller. In our opinion, Central banks in the new EU countries are
quickly gaining reputation and credibility. In addition, the fact that many of them follow
inﬂation targeting strategies makes us conjecture that it is probably the ﬁrst reason, the
present of important structural diﬀerence, which is the heart of the problem.
There is much less evidence in the literature on the eﬀects of shocks originating in the
Euro area for new EU members and on the relative size of domestic vs. external shocks (one
exception is Benczur, et. al. (2004)). Both questions are important. It is often claimed that
small open economies are subject to a considerable amount of external (and uncontrollable)
shocks. If ﬂuctuations in the periphery of the EU are largely attributable to shocks originat-
ing in the Euro area there is scope for coordination activities between policymakers, both
to avoid unnecessary shocks and to jointly respond to unforeseen circumstances. Clearly
having dominant external shocks is insuﬃcient to justify common policies, the extra con-
31dition being that these shocks should have similar eﬀects on the variables of the two areas.
Interestingly, Benczur, et. al. report that, while some of domestic ﬂuctuations in the new
EU members are due to external shocks, the vast majority of the ﬂuctuations comes from
domestically induced disturbances. In other words, while one should worry about shocks
generated in the Euro area, there is still ample room to put the house in order before con-
sidering the consequences of intensifying external links and eliminating the equilibrating
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Figure 10: Responses to Euro area monetary policy shocks
Given that external shocks are less important than domestic ones, what is the channel
through which Euro area shocks are transmitted to the local economies? Consider a con-
32tractionary monetary policy shock in the Euro area. Since, as we have seen, such a shock
has a temporary but sizable eﬀects on industrial output, it is conceivable that the demand
for goods by Euro area ﬁrms will decline. If there are large trade links between the Euro
area and the new EU member countries, the demand for locally produced goods will also
decline and this will have depressing real eﬀects. The magnitude and the importance of
this channel obviously depend on the degree of interdependencies and integration between
t h et w oa r e a .N o t et h a tt h eo p p o s i t ec a na l s o occur as a begger-thy-neighbour policy may
reduce output growth in neighboring countries - see e.g. Mackowiak (2005).
The previous section has also shown that the Euro typically appreciates when the ECB
increases interest rates, as ﬁnancial capital ﬂows to take advantage of higher returns. How-
ever, depressed local demand conditions may also induce industrial capital to move away
from the area, and this especially true when there are complementaries in production.
Therefore a ’capital’ channel may act exactly in the opposite direction as the trade channel
reinforce the beggar-thy-neighbour eﬀect, making the ﬁnal outcome on the new EU countries
uncertain. Also in this case, the level of ﬁnancial integration and the degree of international
capital mobility determines the magnitude and the persistence of this eﬀect. Separating the
two channels is diﬃcult (see Canova (2005)), but such an exercise may therefore provide
useful information to policymakers in order to design the proper reaction to disturbances.
Which channel dominates in the actual data? Do we see industrial output in new EU
countries to contract or to increase in response to contractionary monetary policy shocks?
Do we see inﬂation responses which positively or negatively correlate with inﬂation re-
sponses in the Euro area? Given the short sample and the fact that only quarterly data
for new EU countries is available, the analysis is very tentative and subject to both large
measurement errors and small sample biases. In ﬁgure 10 we report responses of indus-
trial output growth, inﬂation and nominal exchange rate in Poland, Czech Republic and
Hungary when a contractionary monetary policy shock hits the Euro area. While there are
important similarities with the responses of ﬁgure 9, diﬀerences are also noticeable. For
example, in response to tighter monetary policy in the Euro area, industrial output growth
declines in Hungary and Poland but it increases in the Czech republic. That is to say, for
the latter country the capital/beggar-thy-neighbour channel seems to be stronger. Inﬂation
is typically temporarily reduced in all three countries, but the eﬀect becomes positive and
signiﬁcantly so after about two quarters. This is similar to what occurs in the Euro area.
33Furthermore, in the Czech Republic and Hungary, the currency temporarily appreciates
and then strongly depreciates so that the observed inﬂation response could be the result
of increased import costs. In Poland the picture is more complicated: in fact, the nominal
exchange rate ﬁrst depreciates as economic activity contracts and then appreciates after
about a year, therefore making the interpretation of inﬂation responses diﬃcult.
In sum, and tentatively speaking, it appears that both channels of transmission are
present and that their importance depends on a number of factors. Of the three countries,
the Czech republic appears to be the most integrated with the Euro area economy and
the one that seems to beneﬁt most when contractionary policy shocks hit the Euro area
economy. Interestingly, inﬂation responses in all three countries mimic those in the Euro
area, suggesting that, perhaps, some implicit coordination between Central banks is already
taking place. The heterogeneities present in the transmission of Euro area monetary policy
shocks to these three countries will probably be magniﬁed if the sample is extended to
consider other new EU members.
These heterogeneities, if conﬁrmed, should be carefully analyzed once the decision to
adopt the Euro is considered. Rushing into a single currency may be dangerous: without
the exchange rate channel to resolve imbalances, larger heterogeneities in the responses to
monetary policy may magnify the pattern of real and inﬂation diﬀerentials already present
in Euro regions, therefore making monetary policy more diﬃcult and less eﬀective. With
the information present in ﬁgure 10, one can predict that shutting down the exchange rate
channel this may turn out to be less of a problem for the Czech republic and Hungary.
However, there is considerable uncertainty regarding the consequences of such a choice.
Therefore, gains from a less volatile environment must be weighted against the costs of
having one less channel to absorb domestic and international shocks.
4 Implications for Turkey
4.1 Joining the EU
Among the perspective newcomers to the EU and the Euro, Turkey is the largest and the
most densely populated. What are the likely consequences of joining the EU club? Would
joining the EU foster a process of income convergence between Turkey and Europe? Would
the adoption of the Euro cause major changes in the way Euro area shocks in general,
34and monetary policy shocks in particular, are transmitted to the Turkish economy? Most
of these questions can not have a direct answer since they involve a change of regime
which is unprecedented in the history of Turkey. However, the now relatively long list of
countries acceding the EU having comparable stages of development as Turkey, has taught
us important lessons which, to a large extent, are applicable to Turkey as well.
Canova and Boldrin (2002) examined in details a few years before accession took place
the economic prospects of Central European countries (CEC) and tried linked their economic
conditions to those of Greece, Spain and Portugal when they joined the EU. Unsurprisingly,
they found striking similarities between the two experiences. In fact, although the political
and historical circumstances of accession were diﬀerent, macroeconomic conditions in CEC
resembled those of the earlier joiners in terms of cultural characteristics, political past,
structural and socio-economic features, GDP per-capita and labor productivity relative to
the EU average, share of employment in agriculture and openness of the economy, the last
one measured by exports plus imports over GDP. Table 2 reproduces some of their data:
for Central European countries 2000 is used as a benchmark, for Spain and Portugal we
average conditions existing in 1985 and 1986, while for Greece we average the conditions
existing in 1980 and 1981. It is clear that in terms of backwardness (the share of employment
in agriculture), relative income per-capita and labor productivity (Spain is the exception
here) the two experiences are very similar. One important diﬀerence is that CEC were
much more open than Spain, Portugal and Greece were twenty years ago, but this could
be the result of a general trend toward stronger interdependencies between advanced and
less advanced economies. In fact, not only trade interdependencies are stronger, but also
capital ﬂows were considerably larger than those of the three early newcomers. Perhaps
more importantly for our purposes, between 40 and 70 percent of the trade of CEC in 2000
took place with EU countries and about 70 percent of foreign direct investments came from
the EU and Germany, in particular. One more feature makes Central European countries
strongly resemble Spain and Portugal in the early-mid 1980s: labor market dynamics. In
fact, rapid expulsion of workers from agriculture and from traditional industrial sectors,
equally fast increase in unemployment, reduction in the labor force participation rates,
creation of a substantial and a long lasting stock of long-term unemployed - at around
40-50 percent of total unemployment - are important common features of both transition
processes.
35Given these observations, Canova and Boldrin estimated that the costs and the gains
that CEC would enjoy joining the EU will be probably comparable to those experienced
by the previous three newcomers, a prediction which is so far conﬁrmed by the available
data. In particular, their economic and econometric analysis predicted that most of the
convergence gains would take place in the years leading to accession and after that the old
and the new EU members would experience a roughly similar growth path. That is to say,
inequalities between the core and the periphery of the EU existing at the time of accession
are unlikely be eliminated and instead expected to persist for a least a few decades.
Table 2
Indeces of similarity
Openness Employment in Relative GDP Relative Labor
Agriculture per capita Productivity
Spain 85-86 0.29 0.15 0.62 0.95
Portugal 85-86 0.56 0.22 0.49 0.44
Greece 80-81 0.42 NA 0.55 0.52
Czech 2000 1.44 0.05 0.59 0.47
Estonia 2000 0.87 0.07 0.41 0.34
Hungary 2000 1.23 0.07 0.53 0.47
Latvia 2000 1.02 0.14 0.3 0.3
Lithuania 2000 1.06 0.19 0.3 0.26
Poland 2000 0.63 0.25 0.41 0.34
Slovak 2000 1.60 0.08 0.49 0.47
Slovenia 2000 1.20 0.10 0.73 0.50
Turkey 2003 0.60 0.35 0.14 0.25
Why is it a good idea to compare Central European countries with Mediterranean ones
and not with Ireland, which was as backward as the latters when it joined in 1976 and
experienced an extraordinary growth in the late 1990s? There are several reasons that make
the comparison inappropriate. The most important one is that Irish growth did not come in
a vacuum. If CEC would be willing to adopt the policies that Ireland implemented in the last
decade, including aggressive labor market reforms, productivity incentives, tax reductions,
ﬁnancial market deepening, and new legislation to eliminate local market ineﬃciencies, a
much rosier picture would probably result. Accession however, does not come together
with good national policies. Since history and social norms matters, Canova and Boldrin
conjectured that sweeping changes in labor, ﬁnancial and capital market were unlikely to
36occur and, as far as we can tell, have so far not occurred.
Where does Turkey stands relative to previous EU newcomers? Table 2 suggests that
the numbers for Turkey in 2003 are comparable to those of the Mediterranean countries
in the mid-1980s. Few diﬀerences however are worth stressing. Turkey is relatively more
open than old Mediterranean EU joiners; as open as Poland was in 2000 but, in general,
less open then the average CEC. Moreover, more than 50 percent of the trade in goods
and services is already with EU countries. Therefore, while one should expect this share
to increase as membership is granted, its currently high level suggests that gains from
improved trade interdependencies are probably not going to be very large. Second, the
share of the population employed in agriculture is still large compared to those of CEC,
and approximately of the same size as Rumania and Bulgaria, two other countries knocking
at the doors of the EU for membership. This indicates that the job shredding process in
traditional sectors, typical of economies in transition, has yet to take place in Turkey, even
though the economy is relatively open to trade in goods and services. Hence membership
to the EU can bring along substantial transitional labor costs which from an ex-ante point
of view is better to incur before than after joining the club (for this issue compare the
experiences of East Germany and the most dynamic CEC). Third, income per capita is low
relative to the European average and this despite the fact that the contribution of the service
sector to GNP is roughly as large as in the EU. Therefore, while adjustments, improvements
and elimination of ineﬃciencies which need to take place for membership to be granted will
probably spur a fast process of convergence, the mere size of the diﬀerences in income per-
capita makes even the 50-percent-of-EU-average threshold an ambitious goal for the years to
come. Hence, considerable income transfers will have to take place from the core of the EU
to Turkey to avoid large cross regions inequalities. Finally, labor productivity is somewhat
low relative to the EU average and, once again, comparable to the one of Bulgaria and
Rumania. Given that foreign direct investments are a risible fraction of GDP (less than one
percent in 2002, 2003 and 2004), one would expect them to soar as membership is granted
but to make little diﬀerence in terms of labor productivity growth in the next few years.
All in all, past experience and current economic conditions suggest that placing too
high growth expectations on Turkey joining the EU would be misplaced. Membership will
help to reduce income inequalities, but it will not necessarily foster the process of economic
convergence. Regional transfers which will take place under the structural and cohesion
37policies have not become growth engines in Greece, Spain and Portugal; they are unlikely
to do so in CEC and there is no reason to expect the situation to miraculously change
for Turkey. To be clear: they will have a positive impact on local income, but they are
unlikely to change the long-run growth rate of the beneﬁciary regions. To achieve long
run growth at rates higher than average EU level, an appropriate mix of EU and national
policies is needed. This includes fostering trade integration with the EU and setting up the
environment for international capital ﬂows, restructuring public spending and containing
public debt, creating supply side incentives by proper reforms of ﬁscal and social insurance
policies, setting competitive level of labor income taxation and, last but not least, free
movement of capital and labor. Based on historical experience, two types of policies appear
to be particularly relevant. First, public programs for long-term income support, corporate
subsidies and other forms of income transfer have negative eﬀect on economic growth.
Second, labor and capital mobility are good for growth and economic convergence. The
adoption or continuation of various transfer and/or regulation policies aimed at eliminating
labor migration is misplaced and damaging. Fear of migrations have been magniﬁed by
skillful EU politicians: migrations in past enlargements have been small. There is no reason
to expect it to be large were Turkey join the EU.
4.2 Transmission of Euro area shocks to Turkey
There exists an important literature examining the transmission of monetary policy shocks
within Turkey (see, just to cite a few, Gunduz (2000), Berument (2001), Sahinbeyoglu
(2001)). Interestingly, the outcome of these exercises appear to agree with the general
conclusions we have reached for both Euro area countries and CEC. For example Berument,
who uses the spread between the interbank rate and the depreciation of the local currency as
robust indicator of monetary policy over the last 15 years, found that positive innovations
in this variables lead to a fall in prices and output and to an appreciation of the local
currency. Furthermore, he ﬁnds that while the fall in output is temporary, prices and
nominal exchange rate eﬀects appear to be permanent. On the other hand, Sahinbeyoglu,
simulating a small open economy model calibrated to match the high inﬂation experience of
Turkey, ﬁnds that in response to a policy contraction, output falls while the inﬂation rate
and the nominal exchange rate ﬁrst fall and then increase. Relatively speaking, the eﬀects
appear to be larger in magnitude and more persistent than those observed in the Euro
38area and also larger than those experienced in CEC. The broad similarity of the qualitative
pattern of transmission could be due to the fact that Turkish ﬁnancial markets are relatively
free of regulation. Therefore, since markets forces are allowed to operate roughly in the same
way in Turkey and the EU, the transmission of policy shocks is similar to the one observed
in the most advanced countries of the world. Clearly, magnitude diﬀerence can be related
to the historical experience of Turkey, which over the last 25 years witnessed repeated
burst of hyperinﬂation, capital ﬂights and political instability. All of these features make
the exchange rate channel stronger then in other countries and this may lead to stronger
reactions of prices and foreign exchange rates to monetary policy disturbances.
There is very little evidence however on how Euro area monetary policy shocks are
transmitted to Turkey. Knowing the features of transmission and the channels through
which this occur is crucial if one has to predict how trade integration ﬁrst, and the adoption
of the Euro later will aﬀect the Turkish economy. For example, if trade matters most, the
transmission of Euro area shocks will be probably altered as membership is granted but we
should not expect signiﬁcant changes when the Euro is adopted. Once again the analysis is
tentative since the sample is short, the Turkish economy has experienced huge local shocks
over the last 5 years and it is slowly converging to inﬂation rates which are more moderate
than those experienced in the 1980s and 1990s.
Figure 11, which reports the responses of industrial production growth, the inﬂation
rate, the deposit rate, the real eﬀective exchange rate (reer) and the nominal bilateral
exchange rate with the Euro (neer) for the sample 1999-2005 indicates that tightening the
stance of monetary policy in the Euro area produces adjustments in the Turkish economy
which are of considerable size and have signiﬁcant persistence. Interestingly, a temporarily
higher interest rate in the Euro area is accompanied by a decline in Turkish interest rates
and this tends to boots industrial output growth, inﬂation and depreciate the local currency.
This initial eﬀect is reversed in three or four months after which production growth and
inﬂation fall, interest rates increase and both the real eﬀective and the nominal exchange
rates appreciate. While the domestic pattern of responses is internally consistent, the initial
























































































Figure 11: Responses of Turkish variables to a monetary policy shock in the Euro area
In sum, contractionary policy shocks in the Euro area are accompanied by responses
of interest rates, inﬂation and the nominal exchange rate which are somewhat diﬀerent
and more persistent than the ones observed in the new EU countries. If these patterns
are conﬁrmed in future studies, it appears that transferring monetary policy decisions to
the ECB could destabilize the Turkish economy. On the other hand, in the unlikely case
that Turkey would adopt the Euro soon, the task of the ECB would become considerably
more complicated as regional diﬀerences in response to monetary shocks would be greatly
magniﬁed. Finally, it appears that both the trade and the ﬁnancial channels matter for
transmitting Euro area shocks to Turkey. Therefore, the trade integration expected from
EU membership and the deeper ﬁnancial and monetary links that will come with a single
currency may alter both the intensity and the shape of responses presented in ﬁgure 11.
405 Conclusions
This paper has two parts. First, we reviewed the monetary policy strategy currently favored
in academics and contrasted it with the one employed by the ECB. In the process highlighted
the accomplishments and failures of monetary policy in the Euro area over the last ﬁve years
and suggested changes that could streamline the understanding that markets have of the
policy process and, as a consequence, improve its transparency and more clearly anchor
expectation formation. We showed that the good inﬂation outcome experienced over the
last 5 years could have been obtained despite some ﬂaws in the ECB strategy and policies.
We have conjectured that markets participants discounted the noisy signals present the
public statements of the newly established institution and more pragmatically looked at
actions and outcomes. This initial honeymoon eﬀect, which rightly took into account the
diﬃculties and the starting costs faced by a new institution, could turn sour if a more
coherent and transparent approach to policymaking is not taken. We showed that if the
goal of policy is the control the medium term dynamics of inﬂation, the ECB is neglecting
important information which could sharpen the prediction and the control the medium
term inﬂation dynamics; we argued that the separation between monetary and economic
analysis is artiﬁcial and that the focus on monetary aggregates as predictors of medium
terms inﬂation trends misplaced. To the extent that improved inﬂation forecasts are made
and the public understands the uncertain environment in which they are produced, a better
communication can be obtained, credibility will be fostered and a much more appealing
monetary policy strategy will emerge. We also argue that hiding output concerns is not
only potentially misleading but also makes it is very diﬃcult to rationalize certain decisions
t a k e ni nt h el a s tﬁve years only in terms of inﬂation concerns.
The second part of the paper examines the transmission of monetary policy shocks in
the Euro area, in the new EU countries and tries to oﬀer some indications of whether and
how Turkey will beneﬁt from joining the EU ﬁrst and the Euro later. Our analysis reaches
a few important conclusions. First, there are substantial similarities in the qualitative fea-
tures of the response of industrial output growth, inﬂation and the nominal exchange rate to
contractionary domestic monetary policy shocks in the three areas. However, together with
qualitative similarities, magnitude diﬀerences should also be emphasized. These diﬀerence
are easily rationalized once we consider the relative size of the countries, the relative mag-
41nitude of the exchange rate channel and the relative credibility of domestic Central banks.
Second, monetary policy shocks generated in the Euro area tend to have asymmetric eﬀects
on industrial output in the new EU newcomers and while they tend to produce similar
eﬀects on inﬂation and the nominal exchange rate of these countries. Hence the real side of
the Euro area economy is still substantially diﬀerent from those of the EU newcomers. We
already know from the experience of Germany since uniﬁcation that monetary integration
(coordination) without a preliminary process of convergence of the real economies may cre-
ate imbalances which are diﬃcult to resolve once the exchange rate is ﬁxed to unity since
regional relative prices tend to be sticky. Fostering real convergence between the current
and future periphery of the EU should be one of the major goal of all countries which
plan to adopt the Euro. Once real convergence has been obtained, releasing the conduct of
monetary policy to the ECB would probably make little diﬀerence, as far as transmission
of policy shocks are concerned. Third, the real side of the Turkish economy looks today
very much as the real side of earlier Mediterranean joiners of the EU. Therefore, while some
form of real convergence will surely take place in the period leading to accession, income
inequalities and structural heterogeneities are likely to persist for quite some time after
membership is granted. While reforms needed to join the EU will probably be beneﬁcial for
growth and convergence, one should not expect too much from EU structural and cohesion
funds. Such funds have reduced income inequalities between rich and poor regions and in
that sense they have played an important cohesive role. However, they have not typically
led higher growth in the funded regions nor have they changed the underlying structural
characteristics of poor regions. Therefore, structural changes must take place in Turkey
before the admission process is started. The costs of undertaking structural changes are
non-negligible but, if properly handled, will turn out to be temporary. The costs of delaying
the transformations and waiting for the safety net of EU funds are large and long lasting.
Fourth, the transmission of monetary policy shocks in the Euro area constitute a powerful
level on the Turkish economy but, at least for the short sample we have available, they
produce somewhat perverse eﬀects. Hence, it is probably premature to think of releasing
the control of monetary policy to the ECB.
To conclude, the biggest challenge we see for countries wishing to adopt the Euro in the
medium run is to make the real side of their economies more dynamic and to ﬁnd ways to
foster growth paths leading to signiﬁcant real convergence in the years to come. As long
42as monetary policy keeps its focus on maintaining a relatively stable inﬂation environment
and growth reforms take place, the preconditions for joining the EU and adopting the Euro
could be met within a reasonable span of time.
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